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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
DARREN NEIL GREUBER, JR., 
DefendanVPetitioner. 
Case No. 20060009-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
ISSUE 1 
An error by counsel warrants setting aside a criminal judgment only 
when it affects the outcome of the proceedings and deprives the 
defendant of a substantive or procedural right. Defendant claims that 
but for his counsel's alleged error, he would have accepted a plea 
bargain. Was defendant deprived of a substantive or procedural right? 
ISSUE 2 
Did the trial court clearly err in finding that defendant would not have 
accepted a plea bargain, where there was no bargain to accept and both 
of defendant's attorneys testified that he would not have pled guilty to 
murder? 
Standards of Review. On certiorari review, this Court must determine whether 
the court of appeals accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the 
appropriate standard of review. See State v. On, 2005 UT 92, \ 7,127 P.3d 1213. 
Where a trial court has taken evidence on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
the claim presents a mixed question of fact and law to the appellate court. See State 
v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1253 (Utah 1993). The appellate court reviews the trial 
court's factual findings for clear error and any legal conclusion for correctness. Id.; 
Utah R. App. P. 23B(g) ("The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of findings of fact in other 
appeals.") 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
United States Constitution, Amendment VI: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
On October 30, 2001, the State charged defendant by information with one 
count of murder and one count of aggravated kidnapping (R. 4A-4C, 116-18). A 
jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 160-61; 232:84). The court sentenced 
defendant to consecutive prison terms of five years to life and fifteen years to life (R. 
190-91). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court (R. 209). This Court 
transferred the case to the court of appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) 
(West2004)(R.228). 
In that court, defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. Br. Aplt. at 
19-22. He did not claim, however, that his counsel's alleged deficiency prejudiced 
his right to a fair trial. Br. Aplt. at 20. Rather, he claimed that counsel's conduct 
denied him a fair opportunity to accept a plea bargain from the State. Br. Aplt. at 
21-22. He also claimed that the trial court had made a clearly erroneous factual 
finding during a rule 23B remand from the court of appeals. Br. Aplt. at 22-24. 
The court of appeals affirmed defendant's conviction. It first ruled that under 
this Court's decisions in State v. Geary and State v. Knight, defendant had no right to 
a plea bargain. See State v. Grueber, 2005 UT App 480U, f^f 4-5. Consequently, 
defendant's loss of a fair opportunity to accept a plea offer did not constitute 
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prejudice. Id. The court also held that the challenged factual finding was supported 
by the record. Id. at 6-7. 
This Court granted defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On the evening of October 9, 2001, defendant and several members of the 
Silent Aryan Warriors (S. A.W.) kidnapped Don Dorton (R. 229:39,48-49,51). They 
covered his head and upper torso with a sheet, duct taped his wrists and ankles, and 
drove him to a rural area of Salt Lake County (R. 229:49,54-55,110; State's Ex. Nos. 
3, 4, 5, 6, 7). Defendant dragged Dorton thirty feet off the road and dropped an 
eighty-three pound rock on his head (R. 229:56, 59, 62-63,114; 230:107). The rock 
crushed Dorton's skull, killing him (229:116,124-25,141). 
The State charged defendant with one count of murder and one count of 
aggravated kidnapping (R, 4A-4C, 116-18). At the first roll call, on November 13, 
2001, the State made an oral plea offer of one count of murder in exchange for 
dropping the aggravated kidnapping charge (R. 452; 458:60-61). Defense counsel 
conveyed the plea offer to defendant, who quickly rejected it because he did not 
want to plead guilty to murder (R. 453; 458:14, 27, 41-42, 64, 76). Defendant 
understood from his attorneys that the murder charge would ultimately set the 
amount of time the Board of Pardons kept him in prison (R. 453; 458:14-15,41-42, 
76). He and his attorneys concluded that "the marginal cost . . . of the aggravated 
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kidnapping count wasn't worth consideration, because [defendant] would still be 
talking about at least 20 years" (R. 453; 458:42). Moreover, defendant maintained his 
innocence of the crime, and "the difference between being convicted of one count 
and being convicted of both counts wasn't enough to cause him to plead guilty to 
something that he didn't do" (R. 458:15-16,42). Trial counsel thus determined that 
it was fruitless to approach defendant with any plea deals that involved pleading to 
murder (R. 458:45). 
Defendant and his attorneys believed that they had a viable defense based on 
the impeachability of the State's witnesses (R. 458:6, 28-29). The State had no 
physical evidence connecting defendant to the murder (R. 229:23-24). Rather, its 
case consisted of the testimony of co-defendants, who were drug addicts and 
members of S.A.W. (R. 229:23-24; 453; 458:6, 28). The State also had a jailhouse 
informant, David Corcoran, to whom defendant had confessed while incarcerated in 
the Davis County Jail (R. 229:16; 230:70-72; 454; 458:6-7). Defendant told his 
attorneys that he did not confess to Corcoran, but that Corcoran had learned the 
facts of the kidnapping and murder either by reading defendant's discovery or by 
speaking with Larry Rasmussen, a S.A.W. leader and co-defendant in the case (R. 
454-55; 458:7, 14). Defendant gave his counsel the name of an inmate, Floyd 
McCallister, who would testify that Corcoran had told him that he read defendant's 
discovery (R. 458:13-14, 50-51). Defendant did not tell his counsel, however, that 
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Corcoran was transferred out of his cell and had no further contact with defendant 
before defendant received his discovery (R. 455; 458:51-52). 
Before trial, in response to defendant's discovery request, the State disclosed 
the existence of several recordings of defendant's telephone calls from jail (R. 38, 
453). Defendant's trial counsel did not request or listen to the recordings of 
defendant's telephone calls before trial (R. 454; 458:35-36). In some of the phone 
calls that were made after Corcoran had been transferred out of defendant's cell, 
defendant stated that he had not yet received his discovery (R. 455; 458:8, 47, 77). 
On the first day of trial, in opening statements, defense counsel pointed out 
that the State had no physical evidence connecting defendant to Dorton's death (R. 
229:23-24). Counsel added that the State's entire case hinged on the testimony of a 
few methamphetamine addicts who were affiliated with S. A.W. (R. 229:23). Counsel 
did not intimate, however, what evidence defendant would present or whether 
defendant would testify (R. 229:19-26). 
The State's presentation of evidence included testimony from defendant's 
cellmate, David Corcoran, that defendant had confessed while in jail (R. 230:68,71-
75). Corcoran also testified that defendant had asked him to help arrange an alibi 
(R. 230:77-78). When Corcoran was transferred to another section of the jail, 
defendant gave him two letters, which the State presented at trial, instructing 
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Corcoran to contact defendant's cousin and ask her to arrange an alibi for defendant 
(R. 230:78,82-83; State's Ex. Nos. 18C, 18D). 
After the State rested, defendant recalled the State's case manager, Courtney 
Nelson (R. 231:81,86-87). Following Nelson's testimony, defense counsel told the 
court, in the presence of the jury, that he intended to call two more witnesses: Floyd 
McCallister and defendant (R. 231:115). The court called a recess so that defense 
counsel could have Mr. McCallister transported from the jail (R. 231:115). During 
the recess, defendant's trial counsel listened, at the State's suggestion, to the audio 
recordings of defendant's jailhouse telephone calls described in the State's Fourth 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery (R. 231:116,120-22). Trial counsel 
concluded that the contents of the recordings made it impossible for "ethical or 
other considerations" to present testimony from either McCallister or defendant (R. 
231:122). Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on ineffective assistance of 
counsel and failure by the State to provide adequate discovery (R. 231:120-23). The 
trial court denied the mistrial motion, but offered to give a curative instruction to 
the jury (R. 231:128-29). 
The court remained in recess until the next morning (R. 231:129). When the 
jury returned to the courtroom, the court explained that defendant would not 
present any further evidence and instructed the jury not to draw any negative 
inferences from defendant's decision not to present any evidence (R. 232:12-13). 
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The jury found defendant guilty as charged (R. 160-61; 232:84). The court 
sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms for both charges, and defendant 
appealed (R. 190, 209; 250:16-17). 
On appeal, defendant requested and was granted a remand under rule 23B, 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, to supplement the record with findings 
regarding his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (R. 261-72, 293-94). He 
asserted in his remand motion that counsel was deficient for not listening to the 
recordings before trial and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced him 
because, had he known of the tapes, he would have accepted the State's plea bargain 
(R. 271) 
At the evidentiary hearing on remand, defendant testified that if his counsel 
had informed him of the recordings, he would have accepted the State's plea 
bargain (R. 458:9). Both of his attorneys, however, testified that he would not have 
accepted a plea bargain even had they listened to the recordings before trial. The 
trial court found that "defendant would not have accepted the plea offer from the 
State because he did not want to plead guilty to the charge of Murder" (R. 456). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I. Defendant may not predicate a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel on a lost plea bargain. The right to effective counsel exists only to protect 
those substantive and procedural rights guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and 
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There is neither a 
substantive nor a procedural right to a plea bargain. 
POINT II. The trial court's finding that defendant would not have accepted a 
plea bargain is not clearly erroneous. Defendant unequivocally rejected the State's 
plea bargain almost two months before his phone calls were provided to his 
attorneys. Moreover, both of defendant's attorneys said that he would not have 
accepted a plea offer, because he did not want to plead guilty to murder. The only 
evidence that defendant would have accepted the plea bargain was defendant's self-
serving testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS NO SUBSTANTIVE OR PROCEDURAL 
RIGHT TO A PLEA BARGAIN; THUS, LOSS OF A PLEA 
BARGAIN CANNOT CONSTITUTE PREJUDICE IN AN 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIM 
Defendant claims that the court of appeals erred in holding that his counsel 
was not ineffective. Br. Pet. at 12-17. Specifically, he asserts that the court 
incorrectly determined that a lost plea bargain does constitute prejudice under the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Br. Pet. at 12-17. Defendant agrees that he is 
not entitled to a plea bargain. Br. Pet. at 12. He argues instead that any deficient 
performance by counsel that affects the outcome of the plea process is sufficient to 
establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Br. Aplt. at 13-14. 
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Defendant's claim is foreclosed by this Court's decisions in State v. Knight, 734 
P.2d 913, 919 n.7 (Utah 1987), and State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645,646 (Utah 1985). He 
thus asks this Court to overrule Knight. Br. Pet. at 16.l 
A. Defendant must overcome a substantial burden of persuasion to 
overturn State v. Knight. 
Under the doctrine of stare decisis, "the first decision by a court of a particular 
question of law governs later decisions by the same court." State v. Menzies, 889 
P.2d 393, 399 (Utah 1994). Stare decisis is "a cornerstone of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence" and is "crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness of 
adjudication." Id. Thus, "[tjhose asking [this Court] to overturn prior precedent 
have a substantial burden of persuasion." Id. at 398. To satisfy this burden, the 
party seeking to overturn precedent must clearly convince the Court either that (1) 
"the rule was originally erroneous" or (2) that the rule "is no longer sound because 
of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from 
precedent." Id. at 399. Defendant has done neither. 
The rule defendant seeks to overturn—that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel guarantees fair trials, not plea bargains—has been in place for nearly 
Defendant does not acknowledge Geary. See Br. Pet. at ii-iv, 12-17. 
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twenty-one years in Utah. It was first announced in State v. Geary and later 
reaffirmed in State v. Knight 
Geary complained that his trial counsel in a rape trial failed to determine 
before trial that defendant's knife was not the knife that cut the victim's blouse. Id. 
at 646. Geary asserted that had counsel done so, it would have forced a plea bargain 
with the prosecutor. Id. This Court rejected his claim and held that his counsel's 
failure to secure a plea bargain was not prejudice under the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel: "[Geary] loses sight of the fact that our state and federal constitutions 
guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains." Id. 
Two years later, Knight claimed in his appeal from an aggravated robbery 
conviction that the prosecution improperly withheld contact information for some 
of its witnesses. Knight, 734 P.2d at 916. He also claimed that withholding the 
information caused his counsel to be ineffective in advising him to reject a plea offer. 
Id. at 919 n.7. This Court held that Knight was not denied his right to the effective 
assistance of counsel when he rejected the plea offer and went to trial: 
We have previously rejected claims alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel when a defendant has rejected a plea bargain and has retained 
his or her right to a fair trial. . . "[Defendant] loses site of the fact that 
our state and federal constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea 
bargains." 
Id. (quoting Geary, 707 P.2d at 646) (alteration in Knight). 
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In the instant appeal, defendant does not claim that Knight "is no longer 
sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by 
departing from precedent." Menzies 889 P.2d at 399. He claims only that Knight 
was erroneously decided. Br. Pet. at 16-17 ("To the extent that Knight stands for the 
proposition that a defendant is not entitled to effective assistances of counsel during 
plea negotiations, it is at odds with the state and federal constitutions as interpreted 
by the law cited above."). But defendant has failed to show that Knight and Geary 
were incorrect. 
B. Knight and Geary are consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's 
Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has never considered the issue this Court confronted 
in Knight and Geary—whether the Sixth Amendment is violated by counsel's 
mistakes that cause a defendant to reject a plea bargain and retain his right to a fair 
trial. But this Court's decisions in Knight and Geary are consistent with Court's Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence. 
One of the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment is the right to the assistance of 
counsel at all critical stages of a criminal proceeding. See Massiah v. United States, 
377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963). If a 
defendant is denied the assistance of counsel in a critical stage of the proceeding, 
prejudice is presumed. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,692 (1984) ("Actual 
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or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether is legally presumed to 
result in prejudice"); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,659 n.25 (1984) ("The Court 
has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when 
counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a 
critical stage of the proceeding/7). 
But where a defendant has counsel and that counsel performs deficiently, the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel is violated only if the defendant was prejudiced 
by the deficient conduct: "An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, 
does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error 
had no effect on the judgment/7 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92. This is because "the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own sake, but 
because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a fair trial/7 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658. In other words, the Sixth Amendment guarantees 
defendants a fair trial as defined by express rights promised in that Amendment. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85. And effective counsel is necessary not because it is an 
express right, but because it is necessary to protect those express rights. Id. 
Because the right to the effective assistance of counsel is derived from the 
guarantee of other Sixth Amendment rights, the protections it affords are 
circumscribed by the scope of those rights. The U.S. Supreme Court observed as 
much in its most recent opinion on the right to counsel: 
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[OJur recognition of the right to the effective assistance of counsel 
within the Sixth Amendment was a consequence of our perception that 
representation by counsel is critical to the ability of the adversarial 
system to produce just results... Having derived the right to effective 
representation from the purpose of ensuring a fair trial,, we have, 
logically enough, also derived the limits of that right from that same 
purpose. 
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, No. 05-352, slip op. at 6 (June 26,2006) (citations and 
quotations omitted). 
Thus, the right to effective assistance of counsel is "explicitly tied to the 
defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial—a trial in which the determination of 
guilt or innocence is 'just' and 'reliable/'7 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,392-
93 (1986) (Powell, J. concurring in the judgment) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-
86, 696). And, "[t]he benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial 
process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (emphasis added); see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 
368 (1993) ("Our decisions have emphasized that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel exists 'in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial/" (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684)). 
"Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel 
does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the 
law entitles him." Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372; Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,393 n.17 
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(2000). Two post-Strickland decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court illustrate this 
principle. In Nix v. Whiteside, the Court held that Emanuel Whiteside suffered no 
prejudice when his counsel's actions prevented him from presenting perjured 
testimony in his criminal trial. See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157,175-76 (1986). The 
Court noted that the constitutional right to testify does not include the right to 
testify falsely and that his counsel's conduct did not, therefore, deprive Whiteside of 
a fair trial. Id. 
Seven years later, the Court held that Bobby Ray Fretwell was not prejudiced 
by his counsel's failure to assert a sentencing error based on a case that was 
subsequently overruled, but was good law at the time of Fretwell's sentencing. See 
Fretwell 506 U.S. at 371-72. The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel only exists to protect Fretwell's right to a fair trial and that his counsel's 
failure to assert what was later determined to be an erroneous legal claim did not 
render his trial unfair. Id. at 369-71. 
In both cases, the Court based its ruling on the premise that counsel's actions 
did not deprive the defendants of a fair trial, even though the outcome of the 
proceeding might have been different but for counsel's actions. See id. at 371 ("Had 
the trial court chosen to follow [the overruled legal claim], counsel's error would 
have deprived [Fretwell] of the chance to have the state court make an error in his 
favor." (citation and quotations omitted)); Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 175-76 ("Even if we 
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were to assume that the jury might have believed his perjury, it does not follow that 
Whiteside was prejudiced."). Similarly, an error by counsel might affect the 
outcome of plea negotiations by causing a defendant to reject a favorable plea 
bargain. But a favorable plea bargain is not a substantive or procedural right nor is 
it necessary to a fair trial. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507 (1984) ("A plea 
bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance."), [t is not, therefore, 
within the scope of those rights that guarantee of effective counsel protects. 
Defendant nevertheless claims that he has the right "to effective assistance of 
counsel during all critical stages in the proceedings, including plea negotiations and 
a motion to withdraw a plea." Br. Pet. at 15. But Knight's is consistent with this 
claim. It recognizes the right to counsel during plea negations but clarifies that the 
right is violated only if counsel's deficiency prejudices defendant's trial or his right 
to a trial. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 368 ("Our decisions have emphasized that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists 'in order to protect the fundamental right 
to a fair trial.'" (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684)). In other words, while a 
defendant has the right to counsel during plea negotiations, he is only prejudiced by 
counsel's error during plea negotiations if he accepts the plea bargain and waives 
his right to a trial, or if counsel's error reaches forward and prejudices the trial. See 
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52,59-60 (1985). 
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Because Knight is consistent with defendant's claim to effective counsel 
during plea negotiations, most of the cases he cites are inapposite to the real issue— 
whether a lost plea bargain is prejudicial under the right to effective counsel. Most 
of defendant's cases concern claims of uncounseled proceedings, not claims that 
counsel was ineffective. Br. Pet. at 14-15.2 But, as explained, the right to counsel is 
an express right guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and when a defendant lacks 
counsel in a critical proceeding, prejudice is presumed. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692. A 
claim of ineffective assistance, however, requires proof that counsel's deficiency 
rendered the proceeding unfair by depriving defendant of a substantive or 
procedural right. Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372. 
2
 Citing United State v. Garrett, 90 F.3d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1996) (uncounseled 
motion to withdraw a guilty plea); United States v. Veras, 51 F.3d 1365,1369 (7th Cir. 
1995) (brief uncounseled period during which motion to suppress was pending); 
United States v. Ellison, 798 F.2d 1102,1108-09 (7th Cir. 1986) (counsel at motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea had a conflict leaving Ellison "effectively without counsel"); 
United States v. Crowley, 529 F.2d 1066,1069-71 (3rd Cir. 1976) (uncounseled motion 
to withdraw a guilty plea); Garcia v. State, 846 So.2d 660, 661 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2003) (same); Martin v. State, 588 N.E.2d 1291, 1292-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) 
(uncounseled motion to withdraw plea and sentencing); Beals v. State, 802 P.2d 2,4 
(Nev. 1990) (per curiam) (same); Randall v. State, 861 P.2d 314, 315-16 (Okla. Ct. 
Crim. App. 1993) (uncounseled motion to withdraw guilty plea); State v. Ford, 793 
P.2d 397, 403-04 (Utah App. 1990) (uncounseled plea negotiations); Browning v. 
Commonwealth, 452 S.E.2d 360, 362-63 (Vir. Ct. App. 1994) (Browning was 
"effectively without counsel" at hearing on motion to withdraw guilty plea); State v. 
Swindell, 607 R2d 852,855-56 (Wash. 1980) (uncounseled guilty plea); State v. Harell, 
911 P.2d 1034,1035 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (uncounseled motion to withdraw guilty 
plea). 
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Defendant also cites to several federal circuits that have explicitly recognized 
ineffectiveness claims based on a lost plea bargain. Br. Pet. at 14-15.3 These cases 
ground their holding, as defendant does, on the premise that the Strickland analysis 
"applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel involving counsel's advice 
offered during the plea process/' Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3cl 542, 547 (6th Cir. 
2001) (citing Hill, 474 U.S. at58). But, as explained, Knight is consistent with this 
premise. It merely limits reversible errors during the plea process to those errors 
that affect a defendant's due process rights. Moreover, disagreement by other 
jurisdictions does not mean this Court's holding in Knight was wrong. 
There are at least two other states that agree with this Court's holding in 
Knight See State v. Monroe, 757 So.2d 895,897-98 (La. Ct. App. 2000), writ denied, 791 
So.2d 109 (La. 2001); Bryan v. State, 134 S.W.3d 795, 802-03 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004). 
They recognize, as this Court implicitly did in Knight, that "negotiations which do 
not result in a guilty plea, and a resultant embodiment of that plea in the court's 
judgment, do not implicate any constitutionally protected rights or liberty interests." 
Bryan, 134 S.W.3d at 803. Thus, "by failing to accept a plea bargain [a defendant] 
3
 Citing Humphress v. United Statesr 398 F.3d 855,858-59 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 
126 S.Ct. 199 (2005); Magana v. Hofbauer, 263 F.3d 542,547-48 (6th Cir. 2001); Mask v. 
McGinnis, 233 F.3d 132,140 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 534 U.S. 943 (2001); Baker v. Barbo, 
177 F.3d 149,154 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Gordon, 156 F.3d 376,379-80 (2d Cir. 
1998); Paters v. United States, 159 F.3d 1043,1046 (7th Cir. 1998). 
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preserve [s] all of his constitutional rights including his only chance of being found 
not guilty, and [gives] up none/7 Monroe, 757 So.2d at 898. 
Additionally, the federal circuit cases defendant cites rely on an erroneous 
interpretation of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hill v. Lockhart. See supra note 
3. Hill pled guilty to murder and theft. Hill, 474 U.S. at 53. Two years later, he 
sought federal habeas relief on the ground that his attorney was ineffective for 
misadvising him as to his parole eligibility. Id. The Court rejected his claim. It first 
held that the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington applied to claims of 
ineffectiveness in entering a guilty plea. Id. at 370. It noted that the prejudice 
inquiry required courts to determine whether "there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for coimsel's errors, he would not have plead guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial." Id. It then held that Hill had not shown prejudice under Strickland 
because he had not shown that, had counsel correctly advised him, he would have 
rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial. Id. at 60. 
In applying Strickland to guilty pleas, the Court did not hold that any error 
that alters the outcome of the plea bargaining processes violates the right to the 
effective assistance of counsel. It held only that where counsel's deficiency induces 
a defendant to accept a guilty plea and waive his right to trial, the plea is 
involuntary. Id. at 56-57 ("Certainly our justifications for imposing the 'prejudice' 
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requirement in Strickland v. Washington are also relevant in the context of guilty 
pleas/'). 
Hill is thus consistent with prior and subsequent holdings from the Supreme 
Court that "the right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its 
own sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the accused to receive a 
fair trial/' Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 482 (2000) (citations and quotations 
marks omitted); Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369 (quotations omitted); Kimmelman477US. at 
393(Powell, J., concurring) (quotations omitted); Cronic, 466 U.S. at658. As already 
noted, "Unreliability or unfairness does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel 
does not deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to which the 
law entitles him." Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 372. A missed opportunity for a favorable 
plea bargain does not deprive defendant of a substantive or procedural right 
because "[a] plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance." 
Johnson, 467 U.S. at507. So long as a defendant's conviction is accompanied by the 
indicia of fairness required by due process, it complies with the Sixth Amendment, 
regardless of mistakes by counsel. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 ("[T]he Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the 
fundamental right to a fair trial."). 
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G Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's alleged mistake. 
In the instant case, defendant admits that his counsel's alleged mistake did 
not deprive him of anything he is entitled to. Br. Pet. at 12 ("It is not Grueber's 
position that he is entitled to a plea bargain/7). And he does not complain that the 
alleged mistake prejudiced his trial. He asserts only that the alleged mistake 
deprived him of a more favorable outcome. But due process does not guarantee a 
defendant the most favorable of all possible outcomes; it only guarantees that his 
conviction will result from a fair proceeding. See Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 370 ("The 
touchstone of an ineffective-assistance claim is the fairness of the adversary 
proceeding . . . ."). Defendant had a fair trial; he is entitled to nothing more. See 
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656 ("The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the 
right of the accused to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of 
meaningful adversarial testing. When a true adversarial criminal trial has been 
conducted . . . the kind of testing envisioned by the Sixth Amendment has 
occurred."). 
Thus defendant's claim fails. 
II. EVEN IF DUE PROCESS INCLUDED A RIGHT TO A PLEA 
BARGAIN, DEFENDANT WOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED 
A PLEA BARGAIN 
Non-Utah cases recognizing a right to a plea bargain have held that to show 
prejudice, the defendant must demonstrate that but for his counsel's erroneous 
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advice, he would have accepted a plea bargain. See Magana, 263 F.3d at 547. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has added the additional 
requirement that defendant produce objective evidence that he would have 
accepted the plea bargain. See Paters v. United States, 159 F.3d 1043,1046 (7th Cir. 
1998). Under that requirement, the Seventh Circuit has rejected claims where the 
defendant's self-serving statement was the only evidence that he would have 
accepted the plea bargain. See Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065,1068 (7th Cir. 1991). 
Even if this Court adopted the reasoning of these authorities, defendant's 
claim would fail on the prejudice prong. In finding number 15, the trial court ruled 
that regardless of his trial counsel's actions, defendant would not have pled guilty: 
Based on the initial findings as set forth above, the Court further finds 
that the defendant suffered no prejudice from the failure of his trial 
counsel to request from the State copies of the recorded jailhouse 
conversations. Even had counsel listened to the tapes, or CD's, and 
discussed them with the defendant, this Court finds that the defendant 
would not have accepted the plea offer from the State because he did 
not want to plead guilty to the charge of murder. 
(R.455-56). 
Defendant claims, however, that the court of appeals erred when it affirmed 
the trial court's finding that he would not have accepted a plea and that he knew 
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Corcoran had not read his discovery. Br. Pet. at 18-20. Defendant's claim lacks 
merit.4 
Both this Court and the court of appeals have held that following a rule 23B 
remand, the appellate court will "defer to the trial court's findings of fact." See State 
v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f 22,984 P.2d 382; State v. Mecham, 2000 UT App 247,119,9 
P.3d 777. Rule 23B(g), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, states that "[t]he findings 
of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the same standards as the 
review of findings of fact in other appeals." Thus, after a rule 23B hearing, the 
appellate court must "defer" to the trial court's findings by reviewing them only for 
4
 Defendant also challenges factual finding number 13. Br. Pet at 18-19. That 
finding states that defendant knew that Corcoran had not read his discovery: 
13. Because he had personal knowledge of the date he received his 
discovery materials as supplied by the State, and because he further 
knew the date Corcoran had been transferred from his cell, the 
defendant also knew that Corcoran had not read the discovery 
materials and that Corcoran could not be impeached this way. 
(R. 455). Defendant's challenge is outside the scope of this court's review. On 
certiorari review, this court will only consider issues that are fairly included within 
the question presented. See Utah R. App. P. 49(a)(4). This court granted review to 
consider whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that 
defendant would not have accepted a plea bargain even absent counsel's alleged 
mistakes. See Order of the Court, April 20,2006, attached as Addendum B. Finding 
number 13 was not a basis on which the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's 
finding that defendant would not have accepted a plea bargain. Thus, even if 
finding 13 was clearly erroneous, it is irrelevant to the court of appeals' decision, 
and thus outside the scope of, and unnecessary to, this Court's review. 
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clear error. See State v. Daniels, 2002 UT 2, Tf 18,40 R3d 611; State v. Vena, 869 P.2d 
932,935 (Utah 1994). 
"For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, 
resolving all disputes in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination/' Vena, 869 P.2d at 935-36. This Court "must sustain the trial court's 
judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate 
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App 106, | 10, 999 P.2d 1252 (quotations and 
citation omitted). Moreover, it "is the province of the trier of fact to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, and [the appellate court] will not second guess the trial 
court where there is a reasonable basis to support its findings." Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 
UT App 110, If 11, 22 P.3d 1249 (quotations and citation omitted). 
A. Defendant could not have accepted a plea bargain when the State 
disclosed the recordings because there was no bargain to accept. 
As a threshold matter, defendant could not have accepted a plea bargain 
when the State disclosed the existence of the recordings to defense counsel because 
there was no plea bargain on the table. The plea offer was made at the first roll call 
hearing on November 13, 2001, and defendant immediately rejected it (R. 452; 
458:61). The recordings were not disclosed to defense counsel until January 15, 
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2002, more than two months after defendant rejected the plea bargain (R. 37-38). 
No other plea bargains were offered or sought until defense counsel listened to the 
recordings at trial (R. 453; 458:65, 69). 
Thus, defendant could not have accepted a plea bargain when the recordings 
were disclosed, because there was no bargain to accept. At most, defendant could 
only have asked the State to reopen its offer. But any claim that the State would 
have reopened the offer is speculative and cannot, therefore, support a finding of 
prejudice under Strickland. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (requiring defendants to 
show a reasonable probability of a different outcome).5 
5
 Defendant claimed in the court of appeals that the State would have 
accepted a plea to murder up until the trial. Br. Applt. at 21-22. His claim was not 
supported by the record. Vince Meister, the prosecutor, testified at the rule 23B 
hearing only that the State would have accepted a plea, "[depending on the status 
of how the other defendants fell out" (R. 458:73). Defendant's case involved 
numerous co-defendants, some of whom testified against defendant (R. 229:17). 
Meister also agreed that when the State has a strong case, "as a matter of practice as 
a prosecutor, the closer you get to trial and the more preparation you put into trial, 
the less inclined you are to talk about plea offers" (R. 458:72). Thus, the question of 
whether the State would have reopened the plea offer in this case requires 
consideration of a variety of factors, including the prosecutor's view of the strength 
of the State's case, the effect the plea would have had on the prosecution of the co-
defendants, and the amount of time and work the prosecutor had devoted to the 
case. There is no evidence in the record concerning any of these factors. Thus, 
defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the State would have 
reopened the plea offer. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, \ 16,12 R3d 92 (holding 
that defendant bears the burden of assuring that the record is adequate on appeal to 
determine his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel). 
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B. Even had there been an outstanding plea bargain, defendant 
would not have accepted it. 
Even if there had been an outstanding plea offer, the trial court did not clearly 
err when it found that defendant would not have accepted it. During a remand 
under rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the trial court determined that 
defendant would not have accepted a plea offer because "he did not want to plead 
guilty to the charge of Murder" (R. 456). That finding is not clearly erroneous. 
Steven Shapiro, one of defendant's trial attorneys, stated that defendant did 
not want to plead guilty as long as the plea included murder (R. 458:41). He 
explained that the difference in prison time between a conviction for murder and a 
conviction for aggravated kidnapping and murder "wasn't enough to cause 
[defendant] to plead guilty to something that he didn't do" (R. 458:42). Shapiro 
further explained that "the marginal cost . . . of the aggravated kidnapping count 
wasn't worth the consideration, because he would still be talking about at least 20 
years" (R. 458:42). He also agreed that so long as murder was the offer, "it was 
fruitless to try and approach Defendant with any sort of negotiated resolution" (R. 
458:45). 
Additionally, Shapiro never stated that he would have told defendant to 
plead guilty had he known about the recordings. He only stated that it "would 
have altered a number of different things about the case" (R. 458:31). Shapiro 
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refused to "speculate now as to whether or not that might have changed [his] advice 
to [defendant]" (R. 458:31). David Finlayson, defendant's other trial attorney, also 
testified that "the murder charge would really set his ultimate sentence" and that an 
offer to plead to murder "was really considered a no offer" (R. 458:76). 
Defendant alone testified that he would have accepted an offer had he known 
of the recordings (R. 458:9). However, the trial court's findings implicitly rejected 
defendant's self-serving testimony and accepted his attorney's testimonies (R. 455-
56). See Cooke; 2001UT App 110, Tf 11 (It "is the province of the trier of fact to assess 
the credibility of witnesses, and [the appellate court] will not second guess the trial 
court where there is a reasonable basis to support its findings." (quotations and 
citation omitted)). 
Other objective evidence supports the trial court's findings that defendant 
would have rejected a plea offer. Defendant told his attorneys that Corcoran may 
also have learned the facts of his case from a co-defendant, Larry Rassmussen (R. 
458:7,13). Defendant has not shown that this defense was not viable. So long as 
there exists a possible alternative defense, defendant cannot say that it is reasonably 
probable that he would have accepted a plea bargain to murder. See Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694 (requiring defendant to show "reasonable probability" of different 
outcome to prevail on ineffectiveness claim). This objective evidence and the 
testimony of defendant's trial attorneys provides an adequate basis to find that 
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defendant would not have accepted an offer. Thus, the court of appeals correctly 
held that the trial court's findings were not clearly erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
the judgment of the court of appeals. But if this Court reverses the court of appeals, 
it should remand the case for the court to consider whether counsel was deficient.6 
Respectfully submitted July 6,2006. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MATTHEW D.BATES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Respondent 
6
 The question of counsel's deficiency was briefed in the court of appeals. See 
Br. Applt. at 17-20; Br. Aple. at 9-18. But the court did not reach the issue because it 
determined that defendant had failed to establish prejudice. See State v. Grueber, 
2005 UT App 480U. If this Court reverses the court of appeals on the questions of 
prejudice and the trial court's factual findings, there will remain the question of trial 
counsel's performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 ("A convicted defendant's 
claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction 
or death sentence has two components" — deficient performance and prejudice.). 
Where this Court's review on certiorari leaves outstanding issues, the proper course 
is to remand the case for the court of appeals to consider the issues. See State v. 
Maguire, 957 P.2d 598, 600 (Utahl998) (refusing to consider issue on certiorari 
review that was not considered by the court of appeals and explaining that "the 
proper procedure is for [this Court] to reverse the court of appeals and remand this 
case to that court for consideration of [the outstanding issue]"). 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Darren Neil Grueber Jr. appeals his conviction for 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code section 
76-5-203, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2003), and aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
section 76-5-302, see id. § 76-5-302 (2003). We affirm. 
Defendant first argues that his trial counsel was 
ineffective because counsel failed to conduct a reasonable 
investigation, i.e., obtaining and listening to audio tapes of 
Defendants telephone conversations that undermined the defense 
strategy. Defendant asserts that this failure prejudiced him 
because it deprived him of the benefit of a plea bargain. Where 
a trial court rules on a defendants ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim at a remand hearing pursuant to rule 23B of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Utah R. App. P. 23B, the 
defendant's "ineffective assistance claim on appeal presents us 
with a mixed question of law and fact." State v. Classon, 935 
P.2d 524, 531 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). "Accordingly, we defer to 
the trial court!s findings of fact, but review its legal 
conclusions for correctness." Id. 
To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, as 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, !lla defendant must show (1) 
that counsel!s performance was so deficient as to fall below an 
objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for 
counselfs deficient performance there is a reasonable probability 
that the outcome of the trial would have been different.'" Myers 
v. State, 2004 UT 31,1(20, 94 P.3d 211 (quotations and citations 
omitted); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 
(1984). "Failure to satisfy either prong will result in our 
concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective." State 
v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288,1(38, 55 P.3d 1131. 
Applying these principles to the present case, we conclude 
that Defendants claim fails because he suffered no prejudice. 
See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1226 (Utah 1993) ("[W]hen 
confronted with a claim of ineffective assistance, we may choose 
not to consider the adequacy of counsel's performance if we 
determine that any claimed error was not harmful."). Defendant 
argues that he was prejudiced because, but for his trial 
counselfs failure to investigate and discover the defects in the 
defense strategy, Defendant would have accepted the plea bargain 
offered by the State--to drop the charge of aggravated kidnapping 
in exchange for Defendant pleading guilty to murder. However, 
Defendant "loses sight of the fact that our state and federal 
constitutions guarantee fair trials, not plea bargains." State 
v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985); see, e.g., Lockhart v. 
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372 (1993) ("Unreliability or unfairness 
does not result if the ineffectiveness of counsel does not 
deprive the defendant of any substantive or procedural right to 
which the law entitles him."). "We have previously rejected 
claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel when a 
defendant has rejected a plea bargain and has retained his or her 
right to a fair trial." State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 n.7 
(Utah 1987). 
These cases are dispositive. Indeed, the ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim rejected in Knight--"that counsel 
could not advise [the defendant] effectively as to the wisdom of 
accepting or rejecting plea bargain offers without the 
information that was withheld by the prosecution," id.--is 
similar to Defendants claim. Defendant does not cont€>nd that he 
was denied his right to a fair trial but only "that he was 
prejudiced by his [trial] counsel[fs] deficient performance 
during the plea bargaining process." However, because Defendant 
has no right to a plea bargain, see Geary, 707 P.2d at 646, he 
could not be prejudiced by any purported deficient performance 
during the plea bargaining process. Accordingly, Defendants 
claim for ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 
Defendant also challenges the trial court's finding that 
Defendant was not prejudiced by his counsel's failure to listen 
to the audio tapes because "[D]efendant would not have accepted 
the plea offer from the State because he did not want to plead 
900^0179-PA 0 
guilty to [m]urder.nl We review a trial court's factual findings 
for clear error. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 
1994). "For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must 
decide that the factual findings made by the trial court are not 
adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the 
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
determination." Id. at 935-36. Also, "[i]t is the province of 
the trier of fact to assess the credibility of witnesses." Cooke 
v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, ^ 11, 22 P.3d 1249 (alteration in 
original) (citation and quotations omitted). 
The trial court!s finding is supported by the record. 
Although Defendant testified that he would have accepted the plea 
offer had he known of the recordings and their effect on his 
case, both of his attorneys testified that they didn't believe 
Defendant would accept a plea that involved murder because having 
the aggravated kidnapping charge dropped would have little impact 
on his sentence.2 The trial court exercised its discretion in 
believing the attorneys1 testimony instead of Defendant's 
testimony. This finding is not clearly erroneous. Therefore, 
even considering the facts of the case, Defendant suffered no 
prejudice from his counsel's alleged failure to investigate 
because he would not have accepted the guilty plea. 
Accordingly, Defendant's conviction is affirmed. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
xThis finding bolsters our conclusion that Defendant was not 
prejudiced by his trial counselfs performance. 
2For example, David Shapiro, one of Defendant's attorneys, 
testified that from his conversations with Defendant, he 
"believed that [Defendant] said he wasn't going to plead guilty 
to first-degree murder, and we would go to trial if that's the 
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The State of Utah, 
Respondent, 
v. 
Darren Neil Greuber, 
Petitioner. 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
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Case No. 20060009-SC 
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ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed on January 5, 2006. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure, the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is 
granted only as to the following issues: 
1. Whether an attorney's failure to investigate evidence 
that would militate in favor of accepting a plea 
bargain may meet the requirement of demonstrating 
prejudice for an allegation of ineffective assistance 
of counsel. 
2. Whether the record adequately supports the district 
court's finding that Petitioner would not have accepted 
the State's plea offer even if his trial counsel had 
fully investigated the State's evidence. 
A briefing schedule will issue hereafter. Pursuant to rule 
2, the court suspends the provision of rule 26(a) that permits 
the parties to stipulate to an extension of time to submit their 
briefs on the merits. The parties shall not be permitted to 
stipulate to an extension. Additionally, absent extraordinary 
circumstances, no extensions will be granted by motion. The 
parties shall comply with the briefing schedule upon its 
issuance. 
p//W M, W 
FOR THE COURT: 
/ 
Christine M. Durham 
Chief Justice 
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Addendum C 
I1H THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ; FINDINGS OF FACT ON RULE 
23B REMAND 
Plaintiff/ ; 
vs. : CRIMINAL NO. 011916865 
DARREN NEIL GRUEBER, JR., I 
Defendant. i 
This matter came before the Court at a hearing on August 24, 
2004, pursuant to Rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. The 
matter was remanded to this Court by an Order of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, dated April 7, 2004. 
The State appeared through Matthew D. Bates and Christopher 
Ballard, and the defendant was present and represented by counsel, 
Jennifer K. Gowans. The Court, having heard the evidence offered 
by both parties, does hereby make the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On November 13, 2001, the State offered the defendant a 
plea agreement in this case which would have the defendant plead 
guilty to the charge of Murder, a First Degree Felony, and the 
State would then ask the Court to dismiss the charge of Aggravated 
Kidnapping. 
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2. This offer of settlement was conveyed by the defendant's 
counsel to him. 
3. The defendant rejected the State's offer, because he was 
unwilling to plead guilty to the charge of Murder. The defendant 
was advised by his attorneys that the sentence for Murder would 
likely be 20 years in the state penitentiary. Dropping the 
Aggravated Kidnapping charge/ the defendant felt, would only 
nominally benefit him, and would have little impact on his 
sentence. 
4. The defendant believed/ as did his counsel, that the 
defendant would prevail at trial because they felt that the State's 
case was weak in that it consisted mostly of the testimony of gang 
members and drug addicts who were subject to effective impeachment. 
5. The State did not at any time renew its plea offer after 
it was initially rejected by the defendant, even though the 
defendant expressed an interest in accepting that offer after the 
close of the State's evidence at trial. 
6. On January 11, 2002, the State served the defendant's 
counsel with the Fourth Supplemental Response to Request for 
Discovery. This document disclosed the existence of the recordings 
of telephone calls made by the defendant from the Davis County 
Jail. This Response stated that the State would make the defendant 
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copies of the recordings if he would provide blank compact discs or 
audio cassettes. 
7* The defendant was aware while he was housed in the Davis 
County Jail that his telephone calls were subject to being 
recorded. 
8. The defendant's trial counsel/ Steven Shapiro, and David 
Finlayson, did not request copies of those recorded telephone 
conversations or listen to them before trial. 
9. One of the State's witnesses at trial was a jailhouse 
informant, David Corcoran. Mr. Corcoran testified at trial that 
the defendant admitted his guilt to the Murder and Aggravated 
Kidnapping charges in this case. 
10. The defendant and Corcoran were cellmates in the maximum 
security wing of the Davis County Jail from November 8, 2 001 to 
November 19, 2001. On or about November 19, 2 001, Mr. Corcoran was 
transferred into the general jail population and had no further 
contact with the defendant. 
11. A part of the defendant's trial strategy was to impeach 
Mr. Corcoran' s testimony by attempting to show that Corcoran 
fabricated the defendant's confession after reading police reports 
and other materials that the defendant had in his possession while 
they were cellmates. In addition, the defendant thought he could 
impeach Mr. Corcoran's testimony by demonstrating that Corcoran had 
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learned about the details of this case from a Mr. Larry Rasmussen, 
who was a co-defendant of this defendant. Corcoran and Rasmussen 
had been housed together in a holding cell at one time* 
12. In some of the calls recorded after Mr. Corcoran was 
transferred out of the defendants cell, the defendant stated that 
he had not yet received the discovery materials supplied by the 
State of Utah, Therefore, Corcoran could not have learned about 
the case details from reading those reports. 
13. Because the defendant had personal knowledge of the date 
he received his discovery materials as supplied by the State, and 
because he further knew the date Corcoran had been transferred from 
his cell, the defendant also knew that Corcoran had not read the 
discovery materials and that Corcoran could not be impeached this 
way. 
14. While it is true that Corcoran provided critical 
testimony against the defendant, there were eyewitnesses to the 
murder who identified the defendant as the perpetrator of the 
crimes. 
15. Based on the initial findings as set forth above, the 
Court further finds that the defendant suffered no prejudice from 
the failure of his trial counsel to request from the State copies 
of the recorded jailhouse conversations. Even had counsel listened 
to the tapes, or CD!s, and discussed them with the defendant, this 
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Court finds that the defendant would not have accepted the plea 
offer from the State because he did not want to plead guilty to the 
charge of Murder. 
Dated this * 7 day of September, 2004. 
ROBIN W. REESE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact on Rule 23B Remand, to the following, 
this iU day of September, 2004: 
Christopher D. Ballard 
Matthew D. Bates 
Assistant Attorneys General 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Jennifer K. Gowans 
Attorney for Defendant 
33 01 N. University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 84 604 
